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The Russian annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the Russian
military invasion of the eastern regions of Ukraine have caused the flight of
nearly 1.3 million people to other areas of Ukraine.' As of May 2015,
approximately 20,000 of them fled Crimea.2 Utilizing the definition of
"refugee," this article identifies the various vulnerable groups of the
Crimean population who have fled and/or who have a strong tendency to
leave the peninsula, bound for other parts of Ukraine or abroad. This article
explores the historical, social, and political context of the Crimean
population, the reasons for the flight, and the theoretical framework within
the law of forced migration that both the international community, as well as
national authorities, need to consider to solve the consequences of this mass
exodus. Considering the stream of displaced people in Ukraine and their
refugee-like situation, this research raises the conundrum of the definition of
the status of people who have found themselves subject to foreign
occupation.
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1. Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, Ukraine IDP Figures Analysis, http://
www.internal-displacement.org/europe-the-caucasus-and-central-asia/ukraine/figures-analysis
(last visited July 2, 2016); UNHCR, Ukraine Situation: UNHCR Operational Update (Sept. 7,
2015), available at http://unhcr.org.ua/attachments/article/1299/UNHCR%20UKRAINE%20
Operational%20update%2007SEP1 5.pdf.
2. Id. (Besides internal displacement, external displacements of Ukrainians have taken a place
as well. The total number of people seeking asylum or other forms of legal status in
neighboring countries now stands at 1,123,800).
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While the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
and Ukrainian authorities treat the category of those who fled Crimea to the
Ukrainian mainland as internally displaced persons (IDP), this article raises
the question of whether the concept of internally displaced persons
described in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement should apply
to displaced persons who flee foreign occupation. The issue of dejure and de
facto jurisdiction of the state and of the occupying power, and the location
and regime of the international border, raise substantial doubts whether
international law offers an adequate criterion to classify these displaced
persons. The article argues that people who have fled foreign occupation
remain in a unique situation compared to refugees or other categories of
internally displaced persons.
This article also suggests that the Crimean example demonstrates the lack
of an adequate system of protection for such displaced persons. It also
addresses the uncertainty that characterizes the security and military
measures of a state that is subject to intervention and occupation, the issue of
liability for abuse of human rights in occupied territory, and the reasons that
led people to flee their homeland. Domestication of the liability for this
international conflict is inappropriate and misleading. Such a construct is a
deficient framework for the solution of the issue and ignores the essential
peace-building process. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
are not technically applicable to those who flee occupied territory because
they have limited capacity to solve or otherwise to deal with international
conflict. An appropriate system of reparations should be imposed on the
occupying power for causing such flight, which should include compensation
to those who have actually been displaced.4
3. U.N. Secretary-General, Addendum: Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: Rep. of the
Secretary-General, Annex T 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, (Feb. 11, 1998), available at
http://www.un-documents.net/gpid.htm [hereinafter Guiding Principles].
4. Even though reparation is not the subject of this article, the author considers reparation as
a part of the peace-making process, and essential to establish social justice and the rule of law in
post-conflict society. Thus, appropriate characterization of the nature of the conflict, and of the
status of the actors are essential for the choice of the most efficient remedies, and for the
implementation of the most efficient process of reparation. See generally Rep. of the Comm. on
Human Rights, 55th Sess., June 16, 2003, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/I1; MeganJ. Ballard,
Post-Conflict Property Restitution: Flawed Legal and Theoretical Foundations, 28 BERKELEY J. INT'L
LAw. 462 (2010); Charles Philpott, Though The Dog is Dead, The Pig Must Be Killed: Finishing
with Property Restitution to Bosnia-Herzegovina's IDPs and Refugees, 18 J. REFUGEE STUD. 1
(2005); Rhodri C. Williams, Post-Conflict Property Restitution and Refugee Return in Bosnia and
Herzegovina: Implications for International Standard-Setting and Practice, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L &
POL. 441 (2005); Giulia Paglione, Individual Property Restitution: from Deng to Pinheiro - and the
Challenges Ahead, 20 INT'L J. OF REFUGEE L. 1 (2008); Charles B. Philpott, From the Right to
Return to the Return of Rights: Completing Post- War Property Restitution in Bosnia Herzegovina, 18
INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 30 (2006).
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I. Historical Background of Crimea and Its Current Population
A. THE HISTORY OF THE LAND
Geographically, Crimea is a peninsula on the southern coast of Ukraine
(25,880 sq. km.).5 The peninsula's western and southern borders are on the
Black Sea; to the north and east is the Azov Sea.6 The Perekopsky Isthmus
connects the northern peninsula with the mainland of Ukraine.7
Historically, the Crimean Peninsula was under the jurisdiction of Ancient
Greece (7th-6th century BC); of the Roman Empire (6th-4th century BC);
of the Byzantine Empire (until the 12th century CE); of the Ottoman
Empire (1475-1744); of the Russian Empire (1744-1917); of the Russian
Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, later the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (U.S.S.R.) (1917-1954); of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic
(1954-1991); and, finally, of Ukraine since 1991, when it became an
independent republic.8 The issue of current jurisdiction will be discussed
further.
The historical background of the territory and population of Crimea is
important to understand and to consider in this discussion. At the same
time, it is essential to distinguish and separate those historical events that are
legal in nature (viz. manifested by law or international agreements that
legitimately establish the legal rights of the states and the duties of those
who are subject to their dominion). Unfortunately, politicization of
historical events sometimes leads to speculation, assumptions, and
prejudices.
There are three historical periods that highlight the land of Crimea and
illuminate the Crimean Crisis: first, is the history of Crimea under Russian
jurisdiction, both during the Russian Empire, and during the Soviet
regime-a history that has been utilized as an argument by Russians to
justify the annexation of Crimea in March 2014; second, is the legal ground
and rationale of transferring the Oblast of Crimea from the Russian Soviet
Socialist Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954, a
transfer that has been grossly distorted by Russian mass media and in
populist speeches; and third, is the territorial demarcation of the former
Soviet Republics after the dissolution of the U.S.S.R.9
5. Bykova T.B., Krym: Perebig Osnovnych Doistorychnych ta Istorychnych Podiy na Pivostrovi Krym
[Crimea: Course of Major Prehistoric and Historical Events on Peninsula of Crimea] Encyclopedia of
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1. Crimea under Russian Jurisdiction during the Russian Empire and
during the Soviet Regime
The Russian intervention in Crimea takes its roots from the end of the
seventeenth century, when the Russian Empire initially attempted to occupy
the Tatar Khanat (a jurisdiction within the Ottoman Empire whose capital
was in Crimea (1768 - 1774)) and later, during the Russian-Turkish war.'0 In
1744 the Tatar Khanat acquired independence from the Ottoman Empire,
but in April 1783 Catherina the Great annexed Crimea through her
Manifest, including Crimea within the state of Russia ("All-Russia")." From
that time, Crimea remained under the jurisdiction of Russia and ultimately
became part of the Russian Soviet Federalist Socialist Republic, which was
one of fifteen Soviet Republics in the U.S.S.R.12
Russian "sensitivity" to the Crimea peninsula is conveniently connected to
the Russian military presence in the Black Sea (ultimately, virtually the
entire Russian Fleet). The political and military value of Crimea has
generated Russian propaganda, which has had a great influence on the social
perspectives of Russian citizens. Historians and political scientists have tried
to explain the so-called Sevastopol and Crimea "phenomenon" in historical
accounts in the Russian Empire and the U.S.S.R. Professor Serhii Plokhy
employs two principal concepts for that purpose: "territorialization of
memory" and "historical myth as an important element of national
memory."1 In his book the author analyzes the complexity of historical
interpretations related to the defense of the city during the Crimean War of
1853-1856, which is examined in its relation to the history of Russian
national identity.14 Despite the controversy of whether there indeed was a
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Bykova T.B., supra note 5.
13. "The study takes as its point of departure Anthony Smith's definition of the
territorialization of memory as 'a process by which certain kinds of shared memories are
attached to particular territories so that the former ethnic landscapes (or ethnoscapes) and the
latter become historic homelands,' and John A. Armstrong's definition of myth as 'the
integrating phenomenon through which symbols of national identity acquire a coherent





14. "The war resulted from international conflict over the partition of the Ottoman Empire.
In 1853, St. Petersburg began a successful campaign against the Turkish protectorates of
Moldavia and Wallachia, but very soon the Ottomans received crucial support from two
powerful West European states, Britain and France. Neither of these powers wanted Russia to
strengthen its position in the Balkans or take control of the Black Sea straits. . . In 1854 the
allies invaded the Crimea and besieged Sevastopol, the main base of the Imperial Black Sea
Fleet. . . . The Russian fleet could not withstand that of the allies and was forced to retreat to
the Sevastopol harbor. The only factor that helped the Russian Empire in the war and rescued
it from immediate defeat was the heroism of the defenders of Sevastopol.... In 1855, after a
long and exhausting siege, the imperial army had no choice but to withdraw from Sevastopol.
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Russian "victory," the myth regarding the glory of the Russian fleet and the
glory of Sevastopol remain a part of Russian national identity, actively
utilized by both Russian politicians and by the Russian academy, which has
done its bidding, and continues to do so in the present."
This article does not purport to prove any historical facts, unless they are
legal in nature and relevant to the current situation. Social beliefs or public
speeches do not create any legal grounds for a claim over the territory of
Crimea. As the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic became the successor of
the Russian Empire, the Crimean peninsula and the eastern regions of
Ukraine became a part of the new Soviet State. Not until 1939 was the
western part of Ukraine occupied by the Soviet Army, on the eve of World
War II, and forcibly annexed by the U.S.S.R.16 Although the circumstances
were unfortunate, the territory of Ukraine was united into the Ukrainian
Socialist Soviet Republic.
a. The Transfer of the Crimea Oblast to the Jurisdiction of the
Ukrainian S.S.R.
In 1954, the Crimean peninsula, called at that time the Oblast of
Crimea, was transferred from the Russian Soviet Republic to the Ukrainian
Soviet Republic, de jure and de facto remaining within the same state - the
U.S.S.R.'s Although Russian sources and others misleadingly perpetuate the
Soviet myth that transfer of Crimea from Russia to Ukraine was a "gift" of
Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union between 1953 and 1964.19 A simple reading of the law that
effectuated the transfer conclusively demonstrates that such a transfer was
based on logistics and terms that benefited the people of Crimea, as well as
the U.S.S.R. as a whole. The issues of electricity and water supply,
communications, transportation, as well as a variety of political actions, such
as the election process, were more efficient within the borders of the
The war was over. Russia was forced to sign a humiliating Paris peace treaty with the allies that
did not allow it to maintain a Black Sea fleet or fortresses on the shores of the Black Sea. This
military defeat, the first on such a scale since the Muscovite-Polish wars of the seventeenth
century, created the atmosphere in which the Sevastopol myth came into existence." Id. at 187.
15. Vladimir Putin, President, Russian Federation, To the deputies of the State Duma,
members of the Council of the Federation, leaders of the regions of the country, and
representatives of the civil society related to the address of the Republic of Crimea and
Sevastopol on annexation to the Russian Federation (Mar. 18, 2014), available at http://
praguepost.com/eu-news/3 7854-full-text-of-putin-s-speech-on-crimea.
16. Bykova T.B., supra note 5.
17. An oblast is an administrative unit in the administrative and territorial divisions of the
U.S.S.R., and in most of the post-Soviet republics. The jurisdiction of an oblast includes
smaller units, called "raions," that are comprised of country land, villages, and towns, as well as
cities or towns that were designated as of "oblast subordination." Oblast, WIKIPEDIA, http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oblast (last visited June 26, 2016).
18. Konstitutsiia SSSR (1936) [Konst. SSSR] [USSR Constitution] art. 22-23.
19. Even some American academics have adopted this characterization. See, e.g., Maria
Nudelman, Note, Who Owns the Scythian Gold? The Legal and Moral Implications of Ukraine and
Crimea's Cultural Dispute, 38 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1261, 1266 n.22 (2015).
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Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic, as well as the other Soviet Republics, had nominal sovereignty.
The U.S.S.R. was the only political entity that de jure and de facto enjoyed
the power of the state. Thus, such a transaction was subject to the supreme
power of the U.S.S.R., which de facto represented Russian interests. The
Oblast of Crimea, which is a peninsula, was not, and still is not, self-
sufficient territory in terms of infrastructure. Union with the Ukrainian
Republic was a pragmatic decision made by the high Soviet authorities.
There were three official (legal) components of the transition of the
Oblast of Crimea (Crimean Peninsula). The first was the law issued by the
Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialistic
Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) relating to the transition of the Oblast of Crimea from
the Russian S.F.S.R. to the Ukrainian S.S.R., issued February 5, 1954.20 The
second step was the law issued by the Presidium of the Supreme Council of
the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics with the same title, issued
February 19, 1954.21 Both documents stated that the reasons for the transfer
of the Oblast of Crimea were the common economy, territorial closeness,
and intertwined economic and business relations between the Oblast of
Crimea and the Ukrainian S.S.R. The third component of the transition
occurred when the legislature of the U.S.S.R., on April 26, 1954, issued the
Law on Transition of the Oblast of Crimea from the Russian S.F.S.R. to the
Ukrainian S.S.R.22 The law approved the initiative expressed in the
aforementioned documents; reflected the decision to transfer the Oblast of
Crimea from the Russian S.F.S.R. to the Ukrainian S.S.R.; and made
appropriate changes to Articles 22 and 23 of the Constitution of the Soviet
Union (U.S.S.R.).
In sum, it was a pragmatic decision to transfer the Crimean Peninsula to
the Ukrainian S.S.R.; it was accomplished in accordance with all procedural
requirements and was founded on relevant sources of law, including the
Constitution of the U.S.S.R., the Constitution of the Ukrainian S.S.R., and
other legal instruments.
20. Postanovlenie Presidiuma Verkhovnogo Sovieta RSFSR o Peredache Krymskoi Oblasti iz
Sostava RSFSR v. sostav Ukrainskoi SSR [Regulation of the Presidium of the Supreme Council
of the RSFSR on Transition of the Oblast of Crimea from the Russian SFSR to the Ukrainian
SSR], available at http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Crimea_50/photos_03.php?2.
21. Ukaz Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR o Peredache Krymskoi Oblasti iz Sostava
RSFSR v. Sostav Ukrainskoi SSR [Decree of Presidium of Supreme Council of SSSR on
Transition of the Oblast of Crimea from the Russian SFSR to the Ukrainian SSR], Vedomosti
Verhovnogo Sovieta SSSR [VVS SSSR] [Bulletin of the USSR Supreme Council] 1954, No. 4,
Item 64, available at http://docs.cntd.ru/document/765702366.
22. Zakon SSSR o Peredache Krymskoi Oblasti iz Sostava RSFSR v sostav Ukrainskoi SSR
[Law USSR on Transition of the Oblast of Crimea from the Russian SFSR to the Ukrainian
SSR], Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR [VVS SSSR] [Bulletin of the USSR Supreme
Council] 1954, No. 10, Item 211, available at http://docs.cntd.ru/document/901982301.
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b. Territorial Demarcation of the Former Soviet Republics after
Dissolution of the U.S.S.R.
Putting aside the analysis of the Soviet administrative, territorial, and
migration policy, the fact is that the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. left most of
the former Soviet Republics with borders that existed at that time.23
Consequently, Crimea became a part of independent Ukraine.24
Given the desire for autonomy of the population of Crimea, as a result of
long negotiations a legal and political compromise was established between
the government of the independent Republic of Ukraine and local Crimean
authorities, as set forth in the Ukrainian Constitution. According to the
Constitution, Ukraine includes the unitary state of the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea, which has its own parliament, and governs with powers
over agriculture, public infrastructure, and tourism.25 Crimean legislation,
therefore, must be consistent with the Constitution of Ukraine. To date, this
remains the law in Ukraine.
2. The History of the People of Crimea: The Evolution of Their Social and
Political Perspectives
The native population of Crimea is comprised of Crimean Tatars. The
demographic situation in the peninsula has changed through the centuries,
mirroring changes of authority and state jurisdiction. One of the most
dramatic changes happened during Stalin's leadership in 1944. Between
23. Zakon Ukrainy pro Pravonastupnyctvo Ukrainy [Law of Ukraine On Succession of
Ukraine], Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy [VVR] [Bulletin of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine]
1991, No. 46, Item 617; According to Art. 5, the original State border of the Union of the
Soviet Socialist Republics demarcates the territory of Ukraine and distinguishes it from the
other states; and the demarcations of the borders between the Ukrainian SSR and the
Byelorussian SSR, the Russian Soviet Federal Republic, and the Republic of Moldova as of July
16, 1990, established the current state borders of Ukraine. The Alma-Ata Declaration, signed
by eleven heads of states on Dec. 21, 1991, confirmed the dissolution of the USSR, and in its
Preamble it provides that the respective states will continue "recognizing and respecting each
other's territorial integrity and the inviolability of the existing borders." The Alma-Ata
Declaration pmbl., Dec. 23, 1991, available at http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/START/
documents/alma-ata9 1.htm.
24. The dissolution of the USSR and proclamation of the independence of Ukraine were the
highlights of 1991. On Dec. 1, 1991, Ukraine held its first democratic referendum and at the
same time its first democratic election of the President of Ukraine. The only question the
referendum asked was whether voters supported the Act of Proclamation of the Independence
of Ukraine (which was adopted on Aug. 24, 1991). The text of that document was attached to
the bulletin. The turnout for the Referendum was 84.18% of the population of Ukraine. Of
those who voted, 90.32% of voters favored independence. The results of the voting in regions
(oblasts) varied between 83.86% in Lugansk oblast in favor up to 98.67% in Ternopil oblast;
however, only 54.19% of Crimeans and 57.07% of the inhabitants of Sevastopol (a city with
special status) supported independence in Ukraine. Vidomist pro Resultaty Vseukrainskogo
Referendumu, [Information on Ukrainian Referendum] (Dec. 1, 1991), available at http://
www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/15r-VRef/index.php? 11.
25. Konstitutsiia Vseukrainskogo (2004) [Ukraine Constitution].
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May 18 and May 20, 1944, security forces under Stalin's command deported
the entire Crimean Tatar population to Siberia and Uzbekistan.26 According
to Stalinist propaganda, the deportation was a response to collaboration of
Crimean Tatars with Nazis during World War 11.27 More than 230,000
persons were crammed into cargo trains and sent to Central Asia.28
Thousands perished during the long trip in overcrowded railcars without
adequate food and water. 29 In subsequent decades, many Crimean Tatars
returned to their homeland. According to the census, by 2001 the Crimean
Tatar population increased more than 6.3 times, compared to 1989.30 It has
never, however, reached the number of Crimean Tatars who inhabited
Crimea before 1944.
The last census in Ukraine took place in 2001.31 It revealed that the
general population of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea was about
2,024,000 people.32 Among them were Russians - 1,180,400 (58.3 percent);
Ukrainians - 492,200 (24.3 percent); and Crimean Tatars - 243,400 (12
percent).33 Other national minorities included Belarusians, Tatars,
Armenians, Azerbajdzanis, Moldavians, Jews, and Poles.34
The Soviet regime destroyed the national, ethnic, and cultural identity of
the Crimean people. Instead of recognizing national and ideological
diversity, Soviets implemented a policy of scapegoating, persecution,
extermination, disinformation, and mass deportation of those who differed
from the ideal image of Soviet citizen.35 It was Soviet strategic policy to mix
different ethnic groups within the territory of neighboring states and to
settle Russians extensively all over the territory of the Soviet Union.36
26. Ron Redmond, Ukraine: Soviet mass deportations of Tatars remembered, UNHCR (May 19,
2000), http://www.unhcr.org/3ae6b820d4.html; Jeff Rathke, 71st Anniversary of the Deportation
of Crimean Tartars, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (May 18, 2015), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/
2015/05/242558.htm.
27. Redmond, supra note 26.
28. Rathke, supra note 26.
29. Id.
30. National Composition of Population, STATE STATISTICS COMMITTEE OF UKRAINE, http://





35. Jeffrey Mankoff, Russia's Latest Land Grab: How Putin Won Crimea and Lost Ukraine, 93
FOREIGN AFF. 60, 61-62 (2014), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141210/
jeffrey-mankoff/russias-latest-land-grab.
36. Id. ("From 1922 to 1940, Moscow formed the largest of these units into the 15 Soviet
socialist republics; these republics became independent states when the Soviet Union dissolved
in 1991. Although designed as homelands for their titular nationalities, the 15 Soviet socialist
republics each contained their own minority groups, including Azeris in Armenia, Armenians in
Azerbaijan, Abkhazians and Ossetians in Georgia, Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan, and Karakalpaks in
Uzbekistan, along with Russians scattered throughout the non-Russian republics. Such
diversity was part of Stalin's plan. Stalin drew borders through ethnic groups' historical
territories (despite the creation of Uzbekistan, for example, the four other Central Asian Soviet
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Russians brought the Russian language with them as a common language of
communication, as well as Soviet ideology and culture.37 They also
instituted the Soviet system of education as well as systems of governance in
political, economic, and social affairs according to the instructions of the
Communist Party.38
The increase in the Russian population and the dramatic decrease in the
indigenous population in Crimea are documented. In 1760-1770, before
Catherina the Great annexed Crimea in 1783, the Crimean Tatars and
Turkish population in Crimea comprised 92.6 percent of the total.39 In
1939, that number was reduced to 19.4 percent; and in 1944 it was 0
percent.40 The latest data indicate that the percentage rose slightly from the
1970s until 1989, but it never reached more than 1.6 percent during that
period.4' Only in 2001 did Crimean Tatars reach 12 percent of the
population of Crimea.42
Disinformation, propaganda through the education system, and the media
have distorted the true history of Crimea. Ironically, decades later, the
people who live in the regions that experienced the strongest humanitarian
crises because of persecution, extermination, famine, and other repression
fail even to recognize or admit the events as fact.
A prominent example is the story of the Crimean Tatars. Even after
Stalin's death in 1953, Crimean Tatars were prevented from going back to
their homeland, which occupies a strategic position in the Black Sea and had
become a popular vacation and recreation spot for Soviet officials.43 Those
deportees who tried to return to the peninsula were deported anew. New
Crimean inhabitants did not recognize any land titles of the deportees, nor
their right to return. It was only with the weakening of Soviet central
control in the late 1980s that the Crimean Tatars steadily started streaming
home.44 The process of return was technically difficult and was often
painful. Many Crimean Tatars had become stateless, while others held
republics were left with sizable Uzbek minorities) and included smaller autonomous enclaves
within several Soviet republics (such as Abkhazia in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh in
Azerbaijan). From Azerbaijan to Uzbekistan, the presence of concentrated minorities within
ethnically defined Soviet republics stoked enough tension to limit nationalist mobilization
against Moscow. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic already had sizable Russian and
Jewish populations, but Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's decision to give the republic the
Crimean Peninsula in 1954 added a large, territorially concentrated Russian minority.")
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Andrij Illarionov, Etnichnyi Sklad Naselennia Krymu za Try Stolittia [Ethnic composition of the
population of Crimea for three centuries] NEZALEZNYJ KULTOROLOGICZNYJ CHASOPYS "JI" [Indep.





43. Natalia Prokopchuk, Helping Crimean Tatars feel at home again. UNHCR (June 8, 2005),
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=42a7 10bf2&query=Crimea.
44. Id.
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citizenship in Uzbekistan or other former Soviet republics to which they had
no real ties.45 Upon their arrival in Crimea, they found their homes
occupied by new owners or completely destroyed.46
The return of a substantial number of so-called "formerly deported
people" (about 250,000) became a big challenge for newly-independent
Ukraine.47 In addition to legal challenges, the local community of Crimea
did not welcome the returnees. Statements like "go back where you came
from" made the process of integration into society even more difficult. The
issue of property and rights to land caused sporadic conflicts with local
authority as well.48 Such circumstances fueled nostalgia of Russians for
Soviet rule and order. The UNHCR took an important role in supporting
the Ukrainian government in drafting a new law of citizenship, negotiating
citizenship issues between Uzbekistan and Ukraine, and supporting the
integration process of Crimean Tatars into Crimean society.49
Despite remaining difficulties that Crimean Tatars experienced prior to
March 2013, the main legal issues relating to citizenship, social security, and
other economic, political, and cultural rights of Crimean Tatars were mostly
resolved.50 The Crimean Tatars had been enjoying their own unofficial
parliament, the Mejilis, which stated as its purpose the promotion of the
rights and interests of the Crimean Tatars.5'
Crimean Tatars demonstrated strong loyalty to the Ukrainian state and
remained a part of the progressively-oriented population of Ukraine.52 They
supported the pro-western policy of Ukraine, particularly its move toward
integration with the European Union and toward association with NATO.53
Crimean Tatars were active protesters during the Orange Revolution (2004),
as well as during Euromaidan (the mass protests in Kyiv in 2013-2014),
which resulted in the abdication of president Yanukovich.54 In contrast,
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. See Arthur C. Helton, Refugees Magazine Issue 98 (After the Soviet Union) - Bitter
legacy of banishment, UNHCR (1994), http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=
search&docid=3b541e0a4&query=Crimea.
48. Id.
49. Press Release, Public Information Section, High Commissioner Visit to Ukraine, U.N. Press
Release (Sept. 2, 1997), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=
Search&docid=3ae6b8133e&query=crimea.
50. Waleed Ziad & Laryssa Chomiak, A lesson in stifling violent extremism, CHRISTIAN ScI.
MONITOR (Feb. 20, 2007), http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0220/p09s02-coop.html.
5 1. Id.
52. Oxana Shevel, Who are the Crimean Tatars, and why are they important?, WASH. POST, (Mar.
1, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/01/who-are-the-
crimean-tatars-and-why-are-they-important/.
53. Crimean Tatar Leader Backs EU, NATO Membership For Ukraine, RADIO FREE EUROPE
RADIO LIBERTY (Dec. 5, 2009), http://www.rferl.org/content/CrimeanTatarLeaderBacks
EUNATO_MembershipForUkraine/1896014.html.
54. Justyna Prus & Konrad Zasztowt, How the Crimean Tatars Spoil Putin's Annexation Myth,
117 THE POLISH INST. OF INT'L AFFAIRS POLICY PAPER 3, (2015), available at https://
www.pism.pl/files/?id-plik=19825.
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some ethnic Russians in Crimea, especially elderly people who were Soviet
citizens during the regime of the U.S.S.R., view Russia as the successor of
the U.S.S.R., and refused to recognize the crimes against Crimean Tatars;
they supported the candidacy of Victor Yanukovich in the presidential
election in 2010; and they were opposed to closer links with the European
Union and NATO.55
There is a strange nostalgia that Russian ethnic Crimeans embrace about
Soviet times, which they remember as a time of stability and security. The
primary language of communication in Crimea continues to be Russian, and
the prevailing culture among the general population is more "Soviet" than
Ukrainian.56 Responding to the accusation of discrimination against
Russians by the Ukrainian government, the leader of the Crimean Tatars,
Mustafa Jemilov, stated:
Media published in Crimea, including those that are publicly funded,
are in Russian. Ethnic Russians make up no less than 90% of the
executive leadership in Crimea. Of around 60 schools or educational
institutions in Crimea, in only 14 is instruction given in the Crimean
Tatar language, and in 7, Ukrainian, all others teach in Russian57
Russian propaganda, together with the unwillingness of local (Crimean)
authorities to popularize the history of Ukraine and Crimea, eventually led
to disinformation about the history of Ukraine, including the events in Kyiv,
Maidan (November 2013 - February 2014).58 As a result, many Crimeans
were perplexed during the political crisis in Ukraine. President Putin,
controlling this perplexity through the media, used it as an excuse for the
military intervention.59 But, as international experts state:
[... .] when authorizing use of force, the Russian State Duma referred to
protecting Russians in Crimea. However, no evidence shows that
Russians have been under a real physical threat; there was no
humanitarian or human rights crisis. Russia could in no way invoke a
doctrine of humanitarian intervention in order to justify its
intervention. Only extreme cases of gross violations against a people
could legitimize it to invoke the right to self-determination under
international law to mean self-rule. This is clearly not the case in
Crimea.60
55. Id. at 7.
56. Why Crimea is So Dangerous, BBC NEWS (Mar. 11, 2014) http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-europe-26367786.
57. Mustafa Jemilev, Address to the UN Security Council, Arria Formula Meeting, New-York,
(Mar. 31, 2014), available at http://qtmm.org/en/news/4432-mustafa-jemilev-it-is-an-absurd-to-
decide-issue-of-belonging-of-any-territory-region-or-settlement-to-any-state-on-referendum.
58. Prus & Zasztowt, supra note 54, at 1-2.
59. Id.
60. Norwegian Helsinki Committee, Ukraine, Russia Crisis: Q&A: breaches of international law
and human rights issues, Policy paper 1 (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.nhc.no/no/nyheter/?action=
Article.publicShow;id=1283 ;module=Articles;template=print.
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B. THE ILLEGALITY AND ILLEGITIMACY OF THE "REFERENDUM" IN
CRIMEA
The political unrest in Kyiv from November 2013 - February 2014 was
the political excuse for the Kremlin to intervene, first in Crimea, and then in
the eastern part of Ukraine.61 Through utilization of the "propaganda
machine," Russian authorities declared the necessity and obligation "to
protect ethnic Russians."62 On March 1, 2014, President Putin requested
authorization by the State Duma of the Russian Federation to use military
force until "the normalization of the political situation."63
The new Crimean Government, led by extremists and advised by the
Russian political establishment, issued a Resolution on March 6, 2014.64
The Resolution defined questions for the referendum and addressed to the
President and Federal Council of the State Duma of the Russian Federation
the request to initiate the procedure of accession of Crimea to the Russian
Federation.65 The illegitimate referendum on the region's annexation by the
Russian Federation was carried out in an expedited manner on March 16;
and on March 18, the Russian President signed an annexation treaty. 66
The referendum in Crimea was illegal in many respects. These include:
* The legislative referral was made by impostors and self-proclaimed
local politicians. The building of the legislature and Cabinet of
Ministers was seized by Russian insignia armed forces, beginning on
the night of February 26, 2014.67 Some of the members of the
legislature could not get into the building and they, therefore, could
not and did not vote.68
61. Id.
62. Timothy Heritage, Putin Vows to Protect Ethnic Russians Abroad after Ukraine Truce Expires,
REUTERS (July 1, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-putin-russians-id
USKBN0F646620140701.
63. Obrashenie Vladimira Putina v Sovet Federacii Federalnogo Sobrania Rossiiskoi
Federacii, [President Vladimir Putin, Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian
Federation] (Mar. 1, 2014), available at http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20353.
64. Postanovlenie Verhovnoi Rady Avtonomnoi Respubliki Krym o Provedenii
Obshekrymskogo Referenduma [Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea on the Holding of the all-Crimean Referendum], (Mar. 6, 2014), available
at http://www.rada.crimea.ua/act/11689. (According to the Resolution, the bulletin for the
"referendum" stated two questions: First, "Are you in favor of the reunification of Crimea with
Russia as a subject of the Russian Federation," and "Are you for the restoration of the 1992
Crimean constitution of the Crimean Republic and the status of Crimea as a part of Ukraine?")
65. Id.
66. Michael Kelly, Putin: Crimea is a Part ofRussia, Bus. INSIDER (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.
businessinsider.com/live-putin-speaks-about-crimea-2014-3.
67. Simon Shuster, Putins Man in Crime Is Ukraine's Worst Nightmare, TIME (Mar. 10, 2014),
http://time.com/19097/putin-crimea-russia-ukraine-aksyonov; Marie-Louise Gumuchian et al,
Gunmen seize government buildings in Ukraine's Crimea, raise Russian flag, CNN (Feb. 27, 2014),
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/02/27/world/Europe/Ukraine-politics.
68. Shuster, supra note 67.
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* On March 14, 2014, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine decided that
the referendum in Crimea is illegal.69 The Constitutional Court held
that, according to the Constitution of Ukraine, the territorial structure
of Ukraine and the legal regime of the state border shall be
determined exclusively by the law of Ukraine.70 Any changes to the
territory of Ukraine shall be resolved exclusively by an all-Ukrainian
referendum.71 Authority to call an all-Ukrainian referendum on issues
indicated in the Constitution of Ukraine belongs exclusively to the
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (parliament).72
* During the voting, substantial breaches of procedural law for elections
and referenda took place. As Ukraine's Ambassador to the U.N., Yuriy
Sergeyev, stated: "some ballots had been distributed to unregistered
voters, and Russian citizens had been allowed to vote. People unable
to leave their homes had been forced to vote by mobile teams, and
additional lists of voters included citizens who were not qualified to
vote. "73 The results of the illegal referendum were also doubtful
because of a decision to boycott the vote by Crimean Tatars,
numbering some 300,000 people, and ethnic Ukrainians, an additional
half a million.74 Further, "the referendum had offered only two
questions, neither of which would clearly state an option for
maintaining Crimea's autonomous status."71
69. KoHcTuryuittHHMt CyA YTzpaYHH [Constitutional Court of Ukraine] Mar. 14, 2014, Rishenna
Konstytutciinogo Sudu Ukrainy u Spravi za Konstytutciinym Podanniam Vykonujuchogo
Oboviazky Prezydenta Ukrainy, Golovy Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy ta Upovnovazenogo
Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy z Prav Ludyny shodo Vidpovidnosti Konstytucii Ukrainy
(Konstytuciinosti) Postanovy Verkhovnoi Rady Avtonomnoi Respubliky Krym "Pro
provedennia zagalnokrymskogo referendumu" (sprava pro provedennia miscevogo referendumu
v Avtonomnij Respublitci Krym) # 1-13/2014, vid 14 bereznia 2014 r. [Case on the
Constitutional Petition of the Acting President of Ukraine, the Chairman of the Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights Concerning
Compliance with the Constitution of Ukraine (Constitutionality) of the Resolution of the
Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic Crimea "On the Holding of the all-Crimean
Referendum" No. 1-13/2014, of March 14, 2014], Visnyk Konstytutciinogo Sudu Ukrainy






73. Yuriy Sergeyev, Address to the UN Security Council, 7144th Meeting (Mar. 19, 2014),
available at http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/scl1328.doc.htm.
74. Jemilev, supra note 57. (According to the speech of Mustafa Jemilev at the informal
meeting of the UN Security Council on the Crimean crisis by the initiative of Lithuania,
Crimean Tatars totally boycotted the "referendum." It was established that only 0.5% of
Crimean Tatars took part in it, and there is no evidence that they voted in favor of annexation
with Russia. Some reports suggest that the general turnout at the "referendum" was not 82%,
as the occupying authorities claim, but just 32.4%.)
75. Sergeyev, supra note 73.
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Regardless of major breaches of national and international law, on March
17, 2014, Russia acknowledged the result of the so-called referendum and
started the process of imposing its sovereignty in Crimea.76
II. Refugee-Like Status of the People Who Fled Crimea
The flight caused by Russian occupation and explicit imposition of
Russian (foreign) sovereignty over the Ukrainian territory and over the
people who live in Crimea raises the question of the propriety of the
ascription, "Internally Displaced Persons," that has been used to describe
those who fled Crimea.77 The new group of migrants raises concern as to
whether there is an appropriate framework within the existing body of law
or, for that matter, in academic discourse, that would offer an adequate
designation for the status of those who appear to be in a refugee-like status
because they have fled an oppressive regime of foreign occupation.
This issue of categorization of forced migrants was to some extent
addressed in a debate on the subject of "forced migration studies," reflected
in articles in the Journal of Refugee Studies authored by James C.
Hathaway,78 Roberta Cohen,79 Howard Adelman and Susan McGrath,so and
Josh DeWinds, in 2007. The debate confirms some definitions, shapes
distinctive features of "refugees" and "internally displaced persons,"
summarizes some history, and discusses the role of the international
community in protecting displaced persons in the general milieu of forced
migration. In this debate, Professor Hathaway raised the question is "the
effective marriage of 'refugee studies' and 'migration studies' in the union of
'forced migration studies' a good thing?"82
The legal status of Crimean migrants, as well as the phenomenon of flight
from the expansion of Russian sovereignty, expands the subject of refugee
studies. It is argued here that the Crimean flight of 2014 has most of the
distinctive features of an exodus of refugees, and those who fled ultimately
76. Kelly, supra note 66.
77. ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, INTERNAL
DISPLACEMENT IN UKRAINE 3 (2014), available at http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/
122620?download=true [hereinafter Internal Displacement].
78. James C. Hathaway, Debate: Forced Migration Studies: Could We Agree just to "Date"?, 20 J.
REFUGEE STUD. 349 (2007), available at http://jrs.oxfordjournals.org/content/20/3/349.full.
pdf+html.
79. Roberta Cohen, Response to Hathaway, 20 J. REFUGEE STUD. 370 (2007), available at http://
jrs.oxfordjournals.org/content/20/3/3 70.full.pdf+html.
80. Howard Adelman & Susan McGrath, To Date or To Many: That is the Question, 20 J.
REFUGEE STUD. 376 (2007), available at http://jrs.oxfordjournals.org/content/20/3/376.full.
pdf+html.
81. Josh DeWind, Response to Hathaway, 20 J. REFUGEE STUD. 381 (2007), available at http://
jrs.oxfordjournals.org/content/20/3/381.full.pdf+html.
82. Hathaway, supra note 78, at 349.
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remain in a refugee-like status.83 Moreover, it is questionable whether this
category of migrants fits at all in the category of Internally Displaced
Persons, from a practical perspective.84 "Migration studies" opens the door
and gives a context for analyses, research, and appropriate solutions for those
who flee foreign occupation, but who remain in the territory of their
nationality. As Josh DeWind stated in his Response to Hathaway in favor of
a more complex approach to forced migration studies:
Thinking about flight and protection issues from the perspective of
forced migration creates an opportunity to reconceive the nature of the
problem and to design alternative strategies. Considering the plight of
refugees under the rubric of forced migrants brings them into the
context of a broader range of people who have been compelled to move,
both internationally and internally, due to being deprived of human
rights. International migrants deprived of social, cultural, and
economic rights - including but not limited to people displaced by
ecological or developmental forces resulting from government directive
or neglect - would seem to need and deserve international protection
no less than refugees. The same should be said of internally displaced
persons, and refugees who independently set off on their own to find
asylum in third countries, including advanced industrial democracies
whose governments discourage their entry. A forced migration
perspective brings attention not only to these broader protective needs
of individuals but also to the social and political circumstances that
produce persecution and conflict and that limit access to protection.85
"Refugee-like status" derives from the definition of refugee. Pursuant to the
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the term
"refugee" shall apply to any person who:
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing
to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country
of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.86
83. Adrian Edwards, UNHCR viewpoint: 'Refugee' or 'migrant' - Which is right?, UNHCR
(AUG. 27, 2015), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2015/8/55df0e556/unhcr-viewpoint-
refugee-migrant-right.html.
84. Internal Displacement, supra note 77.
85. DeWind, supra note 81, at 382-3.
86. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Art. 1, adopted on July 28, 1951 by the
UN Conf. of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons convened under
UN GA Res. 429 (V) (Dec. 14, 1950), 189 UN TS 150 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954),
available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Professionallnterest/Pages/StatusOfRefugees.aspx
[hereinafter "Convention"]; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted by UN GA
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People who fled Crimea into other parts of Ukraine share the main
features of refugee status, as defined by the Refugee Convention, except for
"being outside the country of his nationality or former habitual residence."87
This characteristic, which would seem to be obvious, is not easy to qualify in
the context of foreign occupation. Crimean migrants share the main features
of refugees that in fact distinguish them from other forced migrants.88
Professor Hathaway defines two key issues in this regard. The first is related
to discrimination. As he puts it:
refugees are persons who are seriously at risk because of who they are or
what they believe. Refugees are therefore doubly deserving: not only is
the risk they have fled profoundly serious, but their exposure to such
risk is based on characteristics which are either unchangeable (like race
or nationality) or so fundamental that they should not have to be
renounced in order to be safe (like religion or political opinion)."
Secondly, "refugee" is a "functional designation directly linked to the
capacity of the international community to guarantee a remedy.89
Another term that is under discussion is "de facto refugee." The term was
adopted by the International Law Association in the London Declaration of
International Law Principles on Internally Displaced Persons.90 The Report
on the Draft Declaration acknowledges that "the theoretical and practical
distinctions between refugees and IDPs have become increasingly blurred.
International protection of and assistance to both categories of displaced
persons have increasingly been based on needs; rather than legal status."91
Despite crossing a non-recognized international border, which will be
discussed below, Crimean migrants are victims of international armed
conflict.92 Consequently, they are victims of the imposition of foreign
sovereignty both in terms of territory and over the people within that
territory.93
Res. 2198 (XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966), Jan. 31, 1967, 606 UN TS 267 (entered into force Oct. 4,
1967).
87. Convention, supra note 86.
88. Hathaway, supra note 78, at 352-3.
89. Id.
90. INT'L LAw Assoc. INT'L COMM. ON INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, DRAFT
DECLARATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAw PRINCIPLES ON INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, 2
(2000), available at http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1 7 [hereinafter London
Declaration].
91. Id.
92. Kateryna Ivashchenko-Stadnik, The impact of the current military conflict on migration and
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Professor Hathaway mentions a "special ethical responsibility" that
"follows not just from the gravity of their predicament, but also from the fact
that it is always possible to address their plight in ways that, regrettably, we
still cannot for those who remain inside their own country."94 This and
other features make the Crimean migrants similar in status to refugees, yet
distinguishable from IDP's, as will be discussed later. Conjunctively, such
factors lead to the necessity for proper categorization of displaced persons as
a predicate for offering appropriate legal remedies for their protection,
which requires a new and expanded lens of forced migration.
In the context of this conflict, consideration of other parameters of
"refugee" is appropriate, such as membership in a particular "social group."
This may be determined by whether there has been abuse of human rights,
which is relevant to the construction of "well-founded fear" and
discrimination. These criteria seem to be satisfied when applied to Crimea's
displaced persons.
A. WELL-FOUNDED FEAR OF BEING PERSECUTED: PRESSURE AND
INTIMIDATION AS A TACTIC OF RUSSIAN AUTHORITY
Since the end of February 2014, the inhabitants of Crimea have
experienced the presence of at least of five armed groups:
* The so-called self-defense group of Crimea, which acquired legal
status within Crimea, led by the defacto "Prime Minister" of Crimea,
Oleksandr Aksionov.95
* The Russian "Cossacks" (paramilitary patriots, or cultural protectors,
who have crossed the border from Russia into Ukraine).96
* The so-called "Army of Crimea," including "the Berkut," headed by
General Kuznietcov, former minister of internal affairs of Crimea.97
* The Russian military, who did not use uniforms with official insignia
until Russia annexed Crimea (referred to by the media and others as
"green men").98
* Armed bandits and marauders.99
94. Hathaway, supra note 78, at 353.
95. Zakon Respubliki Krym o Narodnom Opolchenii - narodnoi druzynie Respubliki Krym [Law of the
Crimea Republic on People's Militia - People's Druzyna of the Republic of Crimea], Krymskiie
Izvestiia [Krym. Izv.] [Crimea Laws] 2014, No. 243 available at http://crimea.gov.ru/
lawmaking-activity/laws, [hereinafter Crimean Law on People's Druzyna].
96. SIviON SHUSTER, Armed Cossacks Flock to Crimea to Help Russian Annexation Bid, Time
(MAR. 12, 2014), http://time.com/22125/ukraine-crimea-cossacks-russia/.
97. Allesandra Prentice, Cossacks, Berkut and other armed men dig in for Crimea stay, REUTERS
(Mar. 2, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-crimea-idUSBREA2 10VZ
20140302.
98. Steven Pifer, Watch out for Litlle Green Men, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Jul. 7, 2014), http://
www.spiegel.de/international/europe/nato-needs-strategy-for-possible-meddling-by-putin-in-
baltic-states-a-979707.html.
99. Valentyna Samar, Z Rosii. "Z lubov'ju" [From Russia. "With Love"], MIRROR UKRAINE
(Apr. 4, 2014) http://gazeta.dt.ua/internal/z-rosiyi-z-lyubov-yu-_.html.
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Mustafa Jemilev, one of the leaders of the Crimean Tatars, spoke at the
informal meeting of the U.N. Security Council on the Crimean crisis on
March 31, 2014.100 Among many issues that are matters of international
concern, he pointed out:
there are paramilitary groups, organized by the authorities, patrolling
who call themselves "self-defense" units or "Cossacks," who are openly
talking about the need for a second deportation of the Crimean Tatars.
There is a very high possibility that bloody ethnic conflicts, or more
precisely, a massacre of Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians, could
break out on Crimean territory in the near future. There have been
cases, and a lot has been written about this in the press, in which houses
lived in by Crimean Tatars have been clearly marked with crosses or
other marks by unknown persons at night. It has become quite ordinary
in Crimea to beat, knife, or kill people who, in one form or another,
express their opposition to the occupying regime.ol
In a Briefing of Members on Events since the Crimea Vote, at the Security
Council 7144th meeting (March 19, 2014), Ivan Simonovic, Assistant
Secretary-General for Human Rights, stated that he had serious concerns
about the protection of human rights, having met with victims of arbitrary
arrest, torture, and ill treatment.1 02 He also expressed concern for the Tatar
community and those who opposed recent political events. 03 Violence and
rumors added to the insecurity among the population and the need for
independent monitors to conduct an objective assessment and report on
violations and on the implications of recent events was urged.104 In the
report dated March 14, 2014, Mr. Simonovic stated:
I am gravely concerned about the situation in Crimea, where there
appears to be no rule of law at present, and therefore a drastic
deterioration in the protection of human rights, as well as rampant fear
and insecurity due to misinformation, blocking of information and total
uncertainty about what is coming next. . . . I have also met with activists
and journalists who were stopped at paramilitary check points, detained
between 9 and 11 March, interrogated, beaten, robbed of their
equipment, harassed, humiliated and subjected to mock executions,
allegedly by a Berkut unit officer. . . . I have been informed about cases
of arbitrary arrest and detention, torture and ill-treatment, and other
human rights violations committed by members of unidentified armed
100. Jemilev, supra note 57.
101. Id.
102. Ivan Simonovic, Address to the UN Security Council On Human Rights Situation in
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groups. Paramilitary forces must be disarmed and the rule of law must
be re-established in Crimea by those who have the power to do so. 105
According to the Monitor of Journalists Investigation, from February 27 to
March 30, 2014, three journalists, twelve activists, and ten officers of the
Ukrainian Military were kidnapped or illegally detained. The so-called self-
defense of Crimea detained victims in a basement of the Crimean military
department. There is still no information about two military personnel and
three activists. Those who were liberated, and made public statements, were
beaten, denied food, and shot. Andriy Shekun, who was a leader of the
Ukrainian community in Crimea and who was involved in organizing
protests against the "referendum" and the annexation of Crimea, was
tortured with an electric chair. The other activist, Yurij Shevchenko, was
shot in both of his legs, and the perpetrators also cut off part of his ear.
Journalists who reported attacks on Ukrainian military bases by the Russian
military were persecuted, beaten, and their equipment (cameras, etc.) was
damaged or confiscated.106
The intimidation, however, did not stop after Russian jurisdiction was
asserted over the people and territory of Crimea. It did not take long for
Russian authorities to ban two Crimean Tatar leaders, Mr. Mustafa Jemilev
and Refat Chubarov, from entering the country. 0 7 On April 22, 2014, the
previous leader of the Mejlis, Mustafa Dzhemilev, was not allowed to enter
Crimea from mainland Ukraine.ios Law enforcement and members of self-
defense units informed him that he would not be allowed to enter Crimea
for five years after Russia's Federal Migration Service (FMS) declared him a
persona non grata in Russia.109 On May 14, 2014, the authorities searched
Dzemilev's house in his absence. Dzemilev has not been charged with any
offense.iio Although Refat Chubarov, the Chair of Mejlis, was away from
Crimea, authorities banned him on July 5, 2014 from entering the peninsula
for five years, and on September 17, 2014, authorities sealed the Mejlis'
office and other Foundation, in addition to freezing the bank accounts,
which effectively paralyzed the activities of the Mejlis.111
105. Ivan Simonovic, Speech, Ukraine: UN deploys human rights monitors amid 'troubling' signs in
east, Crimea (New York, Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.aspNewslD
=47355#.VjYy0tl2sg.
106. Samar, supra note 99.
107. Eleanor Knott, What the Banning of Crimean Tatars' Mejlis Means, ATLANTIC COUNSEL
(May 2, 2016), http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/what-the-banning-of-
crimean-tatars-mejlis-means.
108. Crimean Tatar Leader Barred From Crimea Until 2019, RADIO FREE EUROPE RADIO
LIBERTY (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-crimea-dzhemilev-tatar-leader-
barred/25357847.html.
109. Id.
110. Rights in Retreat: Abuses in Crimea, HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2014), https://www.hrw.org/
report/2014/11/17/rights-retreat/abuses-crimea.
111. Id. at 14.
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Former self-defense groups were ultimately transformed into the legalized
units of the people's militia, which is called "people's druzyna."112 According
to Art. 1 of the law on people's militia, people's druzyna of the Republic of
Crimea is a union created to assist the state authority of the Republic of
Crimea and its law enforcement entities in maintaining social order."1 The
people's militia is comprised of citizens of the Russian Federation."< Art. 6
of this law states that the Head of the Crimea Republic people's druzyna is
appointed, and can be dismissed, by the Head of the Republic of Crimea
(Mr. Aksoinov)."t5
Human Rights Watch reported that that these armed paramilitary groups
have systematically been involved in unlawful detention, abduction, ill-
treatment (including torture), and harassment of pro-Ukraine activists and
other residents, "with complete impunity."116 "Ukrainian human rights
groups have reported that the units have also been involved in unlawful
searches of persons and vehicles, violent dispersals of public gatherings, and
attacks on journalists.""? "Human Rights Watch documented the
involvement of self-defense units in the abductions of at least six activists
from the Euromaidan movement"; attacks and harassment of "numerous
local and foreign journalists"; and dozens of attacks against "reporters.""
"Ukrainian human rights groups have reported that the units have also been
involved in violently dispersing demonstrations, unlawfully searching people
and vehicles, especially at Crimea's administrative borders, and harassing
ordinary citizens."119
Although the law on the people's militia clearly states that the self-defense
units may act only in conjunction with police, other law enforcement
agencies, state executive entities, or self-governance bodies,120 druzyna have
instead reportedly operated "autonomously," regularly harassing,
questioning, and "sometimes beat[ing] people without the presence of
police."121 There is no known evidence that crimes committed by the former
112. The phenomenon of "People's Druzyna" takes its roots from Soviet times and is, thus,
familiar to post-Soviet society as a non-professional or voluntary local police unit that involves
civilians in securing social order and reporting so called "anti-Soviet activity to the authorities."
In the U.S.S.R., the function of police was carried out by "Soviet Militia." The word "police"
was unacceptable to the Soviets because of its imperialistic connotation in Czarist Russia and its
usage in capitalist countries.
113. Crimean Law on People's Druzyna, supra note 95, at art. 1.
114. Id.
115. Id. at art. 6.
116. Ukraine: Activists Detained and Beaten, One Tortured, HuMIAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 25,
2014), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/25/ukraine-activists-detained-and-beaten-one-
tortured.
117. Rights in Retreat: Abuses in Crimea, supra note 110.
118. Crimea: Attacks, 'Disappearances' by Illegal Forces. Rein in Units Operating Outside Law,
HuAI AN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/14/crimea-
attacks-disappearances-illegal-forces.
119. Ukraine: Activists Detained and Beaten, One Tortured, supra note 116.
120. Crimean Law on People's Druzyna, supra note 95, at art. 1, 3.
121. Rights in Retreat: Abuses in Crimea, supra note 110.
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self-defense-groups in February - March 2014, nor any of the more recently
committed abuses of human rights, have been investigated by the Russian
Federation.122 If any internationally recognized state possesses such
evidence, it would be the Russian Federation.
Russian anti-extremist legislation brought the category of "extremist
materials" into the Crimean reality.123 According to the website of the
Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, as of March 27, 2015 the "List
of Extremist Materials," as determined by the Russian courts, includes 2680
different entries.124 A substantial amount of the titles can be categorized as
Islamic literature.125 The anti-extremism activity in Russia involves the
whole spectrum of law enforcement and governmental institutions,
including local authorities.126
"Combating extremism" conveniently justifies searches of the private
homes of Crimean Tatars (primarily the homes of Mejlis members),
journalists, leaders of NGOs, Ukrainians, and those who have supported the
Ukrainian government and the European integration process.1 27 Among
public institutions, the subjects of search are primarily mosques, Islamic
schools, media outlets, and NGOs.128 Along with confiscation of "extremist
materials" and "prohibited literature," in some cases Russian and Crimean
authorities have confiscated computers and office equipment as well.129
Human Rights Watch states that these measures "were carried out by both
local police and Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) but also involved
dozens of unidentified armed, masked men."130
122. Id.
123. See Federal'nyi Zakon RF o Protivodeistvii Ekstremistskoi deiatel'nosti [Federal Law of
the Russian Federation on Counteracting Extremist Activity], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL'STVA
RoSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2002, No. 53,
Item 7580 (part I) [hereinafter Contracting Extremist Activity Law].
124. Federal'nyi Spisok Extremistskikh [Federal list of extremist materials], MATERIALOV
MINISTERSTVO JUSTICI ROSSIISKOJ FEDERATSII [Ministry of Justice of the Russian
Federation], http://minjust.ru/ru/extremist-materials?field extremist-content value&page=13
(last visited Apr. 18, 2015) [hereinafter List of Extremist Materials].
125. See id.; see also, Peter Roudik, Legal Provisions on Fighting Extremism: Russia, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS (Apr. 2014), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/fighting-extremism/russia.php (last
updated Nov. 30, 2015).
126. Peter Roudik, Legal Provisions on Fighting Extremism: Russia, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Apr.
2014), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/fighting-extremism/russia.php (last updated Nov. 30,
2015).
127. Rights in Retreat: Abuses in Crimea, supra note 110.
128. Id. According to Human Rights Watch, between June and September 2014, law




PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
394 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER [VOL. 49, NO. 3
B. VULNERABLE GROUPS: FACTS AND CRITERIA
The violations of human rights, described above, have pushed people to
leave the peninsula. Ultimately their status is defined by the fact of whether
they seek asylum in a foreign state, or whether they go to the mainland of
Ukraine. Because of the cause of flight and the surrounding circumstances,
the conditions that govern the law of refugee status are satisfied. They are
members of targeted vulnerable groups who have been persecuted. The
Crimean case raises the threshold question of the basis upon which people
have been persecuted.
1. Nationality
Citizens of Ukraine who reside in Crimea and who refuse to accept
Russian citizenship have had substantial limitations imposed on their
economic, social, and political rights. In the context of the conflict between
Russians and those who support Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial
integrity, the latter are subject to prosecution for extremism, according to
Russian criminal, administrative, and civil Law.131 As Human Rights Watch
states, Russia did not simply offer
Russian citizenship to residents of Crimea, but rather, Russia. . .compelled
residents to choose between Ukrainian and Russian citizenship while
imposing adverse consequences, directly and indirectly, on those who chose
to retain Ukrainian citizenship.132 In addition, as documented below, there
were serious flaws in the process for Ukrainian citizens who sought to retain
Ukrainian citizenship: some Ukrainian citizens were unable to exercise their
choice to retain citizenship and had Russian citizenship imposed on them.133
Others were subject to harassment and intimidation for not obtaining
Russian citizenship.134 In such circumstances, the imposition of Russian
citizenship in Crimea was coercive.35
2. Religion
a. Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church36
The ideology of Russian humanitarian policy is based on the concept of
"Great Russia."13 This purely imperialistic approach denies any alternative
131. See Yulia Arkhipova and Grigory Frolov, Russian Refugees in Ukraine: The Broken Hopes,
FREE RUSSIA (Feb. 24, 2016), http://www.4freerussia.org/russian-refugees-in-ukraine-the-
broken-hopes/.




136. The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church is a sect of Catholicism that worships under the
auspices of the Pope.
137. Marcin A. Piotrowski, Russia's Security Policy, at 61, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
www.cfr.org/content/.. ./UnderstandRussia2.pdf.
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ideology.138 For example, the Orthodox Church under the Moscow
Patriarch is one of the main pillars of Russian internal and external policy in
the humanitarian sphere.139 Moscow uses the Russian Orthodox Church as a
component of its policy to achieve the unity of all Slavic Christians under
the Russian (Moscow) Patriarchate.140 According to the majority of Russian
Orthodox clergy, this is the only legitimate church; all other Christians are
secessionists or betrayers. Strong historical reciprocal opposition exists
between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic
Church.141 "The Ukrainian Catholic Church (Byzantine rite) was outlawed
under Soviet rule from 1946 to 1989,"142 during which time "many clergy
were imprisoned" in Siberia "and most church properties were seized by the
state or transferred to Russian Orthodox possession."143 Before the
"referendum," there were five communities of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic
Church in Crimea, and they have traditionally comprised approximately ten
percent of the peninsula's inhabitants.'44 Since March 2014, violations of
human rights on the ground of religion have occurred.145
On March 15, 2014, "Father Mykola Kvych, a pastor and Ukrainian
military chaplain, was abducted by pro-Russian forces after celebrating the
liturgy."146
Fr. Kvych told the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church's information
department that he was held and questioned for eight hours by
representatives of the Crimean self-defense force and Russian
intelligence officers. According to Fr. Kvych, they accused him of
'provocations' and of supplying the Ukrainian navy with weapons. Fr.
Kvych maintained that he helped organize the delivery of food to a
blockaded naval base, and that he gave two bulletproof vests to
journalists.147
Fr. Kvych was threatened with the charge of "'extremism,' which in the




141. Crimea: After the Annexation, AMERICAN THE NATIONAL CATHOLIC REVIEW (Apr. 7,
2014), http://americamagazine.org/issue/crimea-after-annexation.
142. Id.
143. Jonathan Luxmoore, In Eastern Ukraine, Church has 'Returned to Catacombs,' Spokesman
Says, THE DIALOG, http://thedialog.org/tag/archbishop-sviatoslav-shevchuk-of-kiev-halych/.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Ukrainian Greek Catholic priest abducted in Crimea, VATICAN RADIo (Mar. 15, 2014), http://
en.radiovaticana.va/news/2014/03/15/ukrainian-greek-catholic-priest abducted in crimea/en
1-781855.
147. Sonya Bilocerkowycz and Sofia Kochmar, Ukrainian Catholics Experiencing "Total
Persecution" in Crimea, CATHOLIC NEws AGENCY (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.catholicnews
agency.com/news/ukrainian-catholics-experiencing-total-persecution-in-crimea/.
148. Id.
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"Fr. Kvych [did] not know how a trial [would] be conducted, since the
national status of Crimea is in dispute."149 Thus, he left Crimea.150
In his speech to the Catholic News Service, "Father Mykhailo
Milchakovskyi, a parish rector and military chaplain from Kerch, Crimea,"
expressed substantial fear for Greek Catholic parishioners and priests.'15 He
said that "officials from Russia's Federal Security Service, or FSB, had called
him in for questioning about his community and to ask whether he
'recognized the new order.' "152 Particularly, Father Mykhailo stated:
... [T]he new government here is portraying us all as nationalists and
extremists . . . . We're determined our Church will not close up and
abandon its mission, and we hope we'll be given permits to return. But
like others, we've had to leave our life and work behind, not knowing
when we'll be back. This is a time of suffering and anxiety. For now,
this is just a temporary evacuation until conditions are safer, but with
tension and pressure now strong, many of us are afraid of being
arrested. People want things to stay as they are, with freedom of
religion, assembly and speech. But if they're forced to accept Russian
passports, they'll have little choice. Our only hope lies with God and
human goodwill.53
While "[r]eferring to the kidnapping of three Ukrainian Greek Catholic
priests in Crimea by pro-Russian forces. . ., [he] stressed that one such case
could be called a mistake, but that 'multiple kidnappings are not an
accident.' "154
b. Ukrainian Orthodox Church
Besides the Ukrainian Catholic Church, the Russian Orthodox Church
and the Russian political elite also do not recognize the Ukrainian Orthodox
Church, which is under the Kiev Patriarchate. "The Ukrainian Orthodox
Church. . .broke away from the Orthodox Church led by the Moscow
Patriarchate in the 1990s.155 There are about 600,000 Ukrainian Orthodox
Christians who live in Crimea and align with the Kiev Patriarchate.156 After
the "referendum," Crimean self-defense groups, or Russian Orthodox priests
accompanied by uniformed Russian military personnel with insignia, entered
Ukrainian Orthodox Churches, asked about registration documents, tried to
149. Id.
150. Luxmoore, supra note 143.
151. Jonathan Luxmoore, Priest: Ukrainian Catholics Flee Crimea to Escape Threats of Arrest,




154. Bilocerkowycz, supra note 147.




PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
WINTER 2016] TRAJECTORY OF CRIMEAN FLIGHT 2014 397
inventory their property, and predicted nationalization of churches,
facilities, and land.17 A priest of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the
military town of Perevalnoye, Crimea, Fr. Ivan, commented on the visit by
the Russian priest with the Russian military.'11 According to him, the
"message was clear: The Ukrainian church that aligns with the Kiev
Patriarch, Filaret, rather than the Moscow Patriarch, Kirill, would have no
place in the new, Russian-controlled Crimea."159 The bishop of the
Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Kliment, said: "Nobody is able to ensure the
safety of Ukrainian Orthodox priests. The church in Kiev can't protect us
and Ukraine's new government isn't in a position to either."16o Additionally,
he stated that "most priests had taken their families out of Crimea."161
c. Islam
Crimean Tatars' historical religious roots are aligned with Islam. A
substantial percentage of "extremist materials," as defined by the Russian
courts, is Islamic literature.162 According to the Law "On Combating
Extremist Activity in the Russian Federation," the production, storage,
dissemination of extremist materials, or other related acts, is an infringement
of the civil, administrative, and criminal law, violation of which leads to
prosecution or other liability.163
"On September 17, 2014, authorities searched a mosque in Simferopol
and, on September 2," the authorities searched a mosque in Yalta.164 There
"[t]he deputy head of the [Religious Directorate of the Muslims of Crimea]
(DUMK) told the media that the search in Yalta involved police, the FSB,
and approximately thirty armed men."165 It is reported that "[t]he search
lasted seven hours and resulted in the authorities confiscating several
religious books."166 Human Rights Watch also reported:
on June 24, 2014, thirty armed men, including police and FSB agents,
forcibly entered a school and conducted an extensive search examining,
among other things, the school's library and students' personal
possessions. According to a DUMK press service statement, law
enforcement broke the front door and several windows in the school.
In September 2014, authorities conducted more searches in several
mosques and Islamic schools, looking for 'extremist literature.'On
September 9, 2014, police and the FSB searched a boarding school in






162. List of Extremist Materials, supra note 124.
163. See Contracting Extremist Activity Law, supra note 123, Art. 9 - 16.
164. Rights in Retreat, supra note 110.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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school library. Children were on the school premises at the time of the
search. As reported by the Crimean Field Mission, some of the students'
parents said that police asked the children to remove all items with
Crimean Tatar symbols on them.167
3. Membership in a Particular Social Group or Political Opinion
"Euromaidan" is a new word that entered the Ukrainian and international
lexicon in November 2013.168 It is an amalgam of two words: "Euro" -
which refers to Europe, and "Maidan" - which means the square, where
people get together to make a collective decision on social, political, or other
important community subjects. Maidan is also a part of the name of the
main square in Kiev (the capital of Ukraine) - Maidan Nezaleznosti, which
translates into the English language as the "Square of Independence," where
the most important events occurred that led to the coining of the new
term.169
Since November 2013, Maidan is not just territory that is part of the city
of Kiev.17o It is the focal point of political and social opposition to the
external and internal policy of the former President of Ukraine, Viktor
Yanukovych, and his government, particularly as it relates to corruption and
abuse of human rights.171
The conflict in Kiev evolved from student protests into a mass protest of
thousands of people from all walks of Ukrainian life.172 The initial protests
encouraged the government to collaborate with Europe, as the previously
established external policy of Ukraine provided. "Euromaidan" became the
ascription for the place of gathering of protesters and, ultimately, has also
become the reference for the people who were involved in these dramatic
events.1 73  "Euromaidanivetc" means "one who is involved in
Euromaidan."174
167. Rights in Retreat, supra note 110.
168. See The Evolution of Euromaidan, RADio FREE EUROPE RADio LIBERTY (Nov. 19, 2014),
http://www.rferl.org/media/photogallery/euromaidan-politics-ukraine/26648497.html.
169. Id.
170. Carmen Scheide and Ulrich Scmid, The EuroMaidan in Ukraine November 2013 till
February 2014, CENTER FOR GOVERNANCE AND CULTURE IN EUROPE, at 3 (Mar. 17, 2014),
http://www.gce.unisg.ch/~/media/internet/content/dateien/instituteundcenters/gce/euxeinos/
euxeinos%2013_2014.pdf.
171. The Evolution of Euromaidan, supra note 168.
172. MarianJ. Rubchak, Mapping Difference: The Many Faces of Women in Contemporary Ukraine,
BERGHAHN BOOKs, 3 (Aug. 30, 2014), https://www.berghahnbooks.com/downloads/intros/
RubchakNew-intro.pdf.
173. See Dr. Serhy Yekelchyk, Why the Maidan? How the Square Became a Place of Civic Action,
UKRAINIAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE HARVARD UNIVERSITY (Mar. 17, 2016), http://www.
huri.harvard.edu/news/news-from-huri/232-how-maidan-became-a-place-of-civic-action.html.
174. "Euromaidan" - slovo roku ukrainskoi movy [Euromaidan - the word of the year in the
Ukrainian language]. According to "Mysloslovo" (mysloslovo.com), the only web-based
dictionary of modern Ukrainian language and slang, written by its users, the word
"Euromaidan" became the "Word of 2013." The main criterion for selection is word popularity
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The protests resulted in the flight of Yanukovych and other high
government officials to Russia, but it also cost the lives of more than one
hundred and twenty-three Ukrainians, and twenty-three disappearances.175
Russia's propaganda labels activists of Euromaidan as Nazis.176 Russian
authorities and media have been consistently using this label.177 Such
disinformation has been used by Russia to justify the intervention in Crimea
to the Russian people.178 Through this tactic, the Russian government has
attempted to maintain political and social unrest, spreading fear among
ethnic Russians in Ukraine who believe in the Russian myth about
"Banderivtci" and their fabricated ties with Nazis during World War 11.179
Many remain ignorant about historical facts. In this way, Russian authorities
have proclaimed the necessity to protect the Russian-speaking population of
Ukraine.so
As a result of Russian intervention in Crimea, and as a consequence of
Russia's support (and importation) of separatist groups in Crimea and in the
eastern regions of Ukraine, those who participated in Euromaidan became a
target group, members of which have been persecuted for the mere fact of
participation in Euromaidan and the expression of their political opinion
about political, economic, and cultural integration with the European Union
and affiliation with NATO. There were some tragic examples in Crimea.
One of them is the death of Reshat Ametov, a Crimean Tatar and activist.181
Ametov was kidnapped during a rally in Simferopol on March 3, 2014, by
three unidentified people in military uniforms.182 "His body was found
bearing signs of torture on March 15, [2014,] near a village in the
Belogorsky district."183 In his talk, U.N. Assistant Secretary-General for
Human Rights, Mr. Simonovic, highlighted the cases of several activists who
during a particular year and its social impact. "Euromaidan" - Word of the Year Ukrainian
Language, ZIK (Dec. 27, 2013), http://zik.ua/ua/news/2013/12/27/yevromaydan-slovo
roku ukrainskoi-movy_450269.
175. Svetlana Kozlenko & Jim Heintz, Troubled Ukraine Marks Year Since Protest Bloodbath in
Kiev, AP (Feb. 20, 2015), http://wayback.archive.org/web/20150221015130/http://abcnews.
go.com/International/wireStory/troubled-ukraine-marks-year-protest-bloodbath-kiev-29103
345.
176. See Directorate General for External Policies Policy Dep't, The Situation of National





179. See Grzegorz Rossolinski-Liebe, Celebrating Fascism and War Criminality in Edmonton: The
Political Myth and Cult of Stepan Bandera in Multicultural Canada, KAKANIEN REVISITED, at 2
(Jan. 29, 2010), http://www.kakanien-revisited.at/beitr/fallstudie/grossolinski-liebe2.pdf.
180. See Putin: Russian Citizens, Troops Threatened in Ukraine, Need Armed Forces' Protection,
RussiA TODAY (Mar. 1, 2014), https://www.rt.com/news/russia-troops-ukraine-possible-359/.
181. Rights in Retreat: Abuses in Crimea, supra note 110.
182. Id.
183. Human Rights at Heightened Risk in Crimea, CIVIL SOLIDARITY (Mar. 20, 2014), http://
www.civicsolidarity.org/article/902/human-rights-heightened-risk-crimea.
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were "unaccounted for, including Andrey Shchekun, Anatoliy Koval'skiy and
his son, Sergey Koval'skiy, Mr. Taneev, and Mikhail Vdovchenko."184 "He
stressed that the human rights of all must be respected throughout Ukraine,
including in Crimea, and particularly the right of all to participate in public
affairs and political life without discrimination."185
III. The Status of People Who Fled Crimea: The Conundrum of
International Law
The issue of de jure and de facto jurisdiction of the state and of the
occupying power, as well as the location and regime of the international
border, raises substantial doubts whether international law offers an
adequate criterion to classify many displaced persons, particularly those who
have fled foreign occupation.186 This article argues that people who have
fled foreign occupation remain in a unique situation, compared to other de
facto refugee categories and, in particular, that their status should be
distinguished from those who are categorized as internally displaced persons.
A. FORCED MIGRATION IN UKRAINE THROUGH THE LENS OF THE
GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT
According to data from the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine, as of
August 28, 2015, there were 1,459,226 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in
Ukraine; and, according to the State Emergency Service of Ukraine, there
are some 20,000 IDPs from Crimea.187 That number might be even higher,
however, because implementation of the centralized registration system has
not yet been completed.-s
The Republic of Ukraine does not recognize the result of the
"referendum" in Crimea, nor does it recognize Russia's annexation of
Crimea.189 Instead, Ukraine has declared that the status of Crimea is that of
184. Ukraine - UN human rights monitors deployed to assess recent and ongoing violations, UN
HumAN RIGHTS OFF. HIGH COMM'R, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Display
News.aspx?NewslD= 143 72#sthash.FHuevle8.dpuf.
185. Id.
186. Ukraine IDP Figures Analysis, IDMC (Aug. 2015), http://www.internal-displacement.org/
europe-the-caucasus-and-central-asia/ukraine/figures-analysis;); see also Internal Displacement
Statistics in Ukraine, UNCHR, http://unhcr.org.ua/en/who-we-help/internally-displaced-people
(last visited April 18, 2015); Global Overview 2015: People Internally Displaced by Conflict and
Violence, IDMC (May 2015), http://www.nrc.ch/publications/2015/global-overview-2015-
people-internally-displaced-by-conflict-and-violence.
187. Internal Displacement Statistics in Ukraine, supra note 187; Global Overview 2015, supra note
186.
188. Internal Displacement Statistics in Uraine, supra note 187; Global Overview 2015, supra note
186.
189. See Zakon Ukrainy pro Zabezpechennia Pray i Svobod Hromadian ta Pravovyj Rezym na
Tymchasovo Okupovanij Terytorii Ukrainy [Law of Ukraine on Ensuring Civil Rights and
Freedoms, and the Legal Regime on the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine],
VERKHOVNOI RADY UKRAury [VRU][Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine] 2014, No. 1207-VII,
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
WINTER 20161 TRAJECTORY OF CRIMEAN FLIGHT 2014 401
a temporarily occupied territory, the result of Russian military aggression.190
In its own legal framework, Ukraine defines IDPs in its Law on Ensuring of
Rights and Freedoms of Internally Displaced Persons.191 According to this
statute, internally displaced persons are people who permanently reside in
Ukraine, and who were forced to leave or who voluntarily left their
residence as a result or "to avoid the negative impact of armed conflict,
temporary occupation, situations of generalized violence, mass violations of
human rights, or disasters of natural or human-made origin."192
The geography of the occupation extends from Crimea to the eastern
parts of Ukraine, the Donetsk and Lugansk regions (referred to collectively
as the Donbas region). But the occupation in the Donbas region differs
from the one in Crimea. Crimea, being annexed by the Russian Federation,
became totally subject to Russian legislation.193 Consequently, the Republic
of Ukraine has been divided into: (1) territory that remains under the
jurisdiction of the Ukrainian government; (2) territory under Russian defacto
and full internal de jure control (Crimea); (3) and territory under de facto
control of a Russian "puppet government," or "rebels" (as denominated by
the international media; "separatists" and "terrorists" as denominated by
Ukraine) who are supported by Russia with ordnance, troops, leadership,
and money.1 94 This third category eventually led to the establishment of two
self-proclaimed republics: "The Donetsk Peoples Republic" and "The
Lugansk Peoples Republic."
[The modern term of occupation emphasizes not as much] the course
through which the territory came under the foreign state's control,
whether through actual fighting or otherwise, but rather on the
phenomenon of occupation: the exceptional exercise of public power by
one state in a foreign territory and over its inhabitants. This
phenomenon can be defined as the effective control of a power over
territory to which that power has no sovereign title, without the volition
of the sovereign of that territory. . . . [T]he territorial scope of state
parties' obligations under most human rights treaties encompass areas
available at http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/anot/uk/1207-18 [hereinafter Law on Occupied
Territory].
190. Id. at art. 3.
191. See Zakon Ukrainy pro Zabezpechennia Pray i Svobod Vnutrishnio Peremishenykh Osib
[Law of Ukraine on Ensuring of Rights and Freedoms of Internally Displaced Persons],
VERKHOVNOI RADY UKRAINY [VRU][Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine] 2015, No. 921-VIII,
available at http://unhcr.org.ua/en/who-we-help/internally-displaced-people [hereinafter Law
on IDPs].
192. Id. at art. 1.
193. Dogovor mezdu Rossiiskoi Federatsiei i Respublikoi Krym o Priniatii v Rossiiskuyu
Federatsiu Respubliki Krym i Obrazovanii v Sostavie Rossiiskoi Federatsii novykh sub'ektov
[Agreement Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Crimea Regarding the
Annexation of the Republic of Crimea and Creating of New Subjects Within the Russian
Federation] Mar. 18, 2014, available at http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20605
[hereinafter Agreement Regarding Annexation].
194. Id.
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"under their jurisdiction" which means under their "effective control,"
and occupied territories would be included under that definition....
According to the principle of the continuity of obligations, as endorsed
by the UN Human Rights Committee, . . . the rights guaranteed under
the [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] belong to the
people living in the territory of a State party, and that once the people
are accorded the protection of the rights under the Covenant, such
protection devolves with territory and continues to belong to them,
notwithstanding changes in the administration of that territory.195
The Law of Occupation consists of the law of international armed
conflict, which is based on the Hague Regulations of 1907, the Fourth
Geneva Convention of 1949 (GCIV), the Additional Protocol to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 (Protocol l), customary international law, and the body
of human rights law.196 As Francois Bugnion states,
international humanitarian law has many provisions protecting
refugees, stateless persons and internally displaced persons, all of whom
are also covered by the general rules protecting the civilian population
from the effects of the hostilities and from forcible transfers and
deportation; refugees and stateless persons are further protected by
rules that relate specifically to them."197
Unlike refugees who flee their homeland because their state cannot or will
not protect them or because their state itself causes them harm, Crimean
Ukrainians have been seeking protection from Ukrainian authority.
Crimean migrants are people who flee Russian (foreign) occupation but have
features that distinguish them from other forced migrants in Ukraine.
There are three reasons to distinguish Crimean people from other migrants
in Ukraine:
1. Crimea is an example of direct imposition of foreign sovereignty
over the territory of another sovereign state. Annexation of Crimea
led to Constitutional changes in Russia; consequently, Russian
legislation became binding in Crimea.198
2. Crimea has one of the most diverse populations in Ukraine,
featuring an indigenous population (Crimean Tatars), one of the
most vulnerable groups in the occupied territory.199
195. Eyal Benvenisti, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 3, 14-15 (2d ed. Oxford
Univ. Press. 2012).
196. See Francois Bugnion, Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons, and International Humanitarian
Law, 28 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1397, 1399-1403 (2004). Ukraine and the Russian Federation are
both parties to the aforementioned documents.
197. Id. at 1408.
198. The Situation of National Minorities in Crimea Following its Annexation by Russia, supra note
176, at 12, 25.
199. Id. at 8.
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3. Russian legislation substantially limits the rights and freedoms of
the indigenous people of Crimea, and those of Ukrainian citizens.200
There are at least four categories of Crimeans who comprise vulnerable or
targeted groups and who remain in or have potential to acquire a "refugee-
like" status.
* Crimean Tatars;
* Families of Ukrainian military personnel;
* Ukrainian nationalists and activists who were involved in "Maidan"
and anti-Russian war rallies and protests;
* Priests and clergy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and of the
Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church.201
According to the official perspective of the Ukrainian government, people
who fled Crimea are citizens of Ukraine and are treated as internally
displaced persons (IDPs).202 Such position is absolutely consistent with the
position of UNHCR.203
The status of IDPs is described in the Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement.204 Regardless of its non-binding nature, the Guiding
Principles is the only international document that reflects current practice
and addresses "the specific needs of internally displaced persons worldwide
by identifying rights and guarantees relevant to their protection. . . . They
apply to the different phases of displacement, providing protection against
arbitrary displacement, access to protection and assistance during
displacement and guarantees during return or alternative settlement and
reintegration."205 The ideology of the document is expressed by Francis
Deng: "The overarching rationale and foundation of the Principles is a
positive interpretation of the notion of sovereignty as entailing
responsibility, as stated in Principle 3: '[n]ational authorities have the
primary duty and responsibility to provide protection and humanitarian
assistance to internally displaced persons within their jurisdiction.' "206
The situation in Crimea, however, wherein the people who flee territories
that are occupied as a result of foreign invasion, is inconsistent with the
framework of "internally displaced persons," and, in particular, with how
"internally" correlates with territorial, jurisdictional, international, and
citizenship dimensions. Appropriately defining the legal status of those who
200. Id.
201. See id. at 14-7.
202. Law on IDPs, supra note 191, at art. 1.
203. See UNHCR Reg'l Representation for Belr., Mold. and Ukr., UNCHR's preliminary
comments on draft legislation regarding the rights and obligations of citizens on the territory of the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea, UNCHR (Mar. 23, 2014), http://unhcr.org.ua/en/2011-08-26-
06-58-56/news-archive/1242-unhcr-concerned-by-ukrainian-draft-legislationaffecting-the-
rights-of-displaced-persons-from-crimea.
204. Guiding Principles, supra note 3.
205. Id. at intro. n. 9.
206. Francis Deng, International Response to Internal Displacement: A Revolution in the Making, 11
Hum. RTs BRIEF 1, 2 (2004).
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flee foreign occupation is essential. Legal status cannot focus exclusively on
needs, which are to a large degree similar for all displaced persons. Rather,
it must follow from the nature of the conflict. Only then may adequate
judicial remedies be determined involving the appropriate parties.
One of the most inspiring things about the London Declaration is that it
"establish[es] minimum standards of responsibilities by which States, defacto
authorities, the United Nations and other organizations, both governmental
and nongovernmental, may be expected to implement those aspirations."207
The standards for establishing the responsibilities of the competent
authority are the keys to the solution of such flight and its consequences.
Analysis of the political and military situation and the social and economic
circumstances in Ukraine raises substantial doubts regarding consistency
between the status of IDPs described in the Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement and the actual status of those who flee foreign occupation.208
The significance of such inconsistency is evident when considering the Law
of Ukraine on IDPs, the inability of those who fled to return safely to their
home environment, and their ineligibility to be compensated in an
appropriate way.2 0 9 Moreover, the bureaucracy that the Law of Ukraine
establishes for IDP's is inadequate for people who have fled foreign
occupation.210
For example, according to Art. 4, the fact of internal displacement is
evidenced by a certificate of registration of the internally displaced person,
which is valid for six months from date of issuance.211 Validity of this
certificate may be extended for the next six months, but the displaced person
must again follow the same procedure.212 Another provision imposes some
obligations on IDPs, inter alia, to visit the relevant social protection
department of the authorized state migration body once every six months;
and to inform the nearest local department of the central executive body that
implements state policy on migration (immigration and emigration) of
Ukraine within ten days of a new residence.213 Those who return to the
abandoned place of previous residence in Crimea or move abroad for
permanent residence lose IDP status 2 1 4 and along with it guarantees of
compensation for the flight.215 Such procedural requirements might be
justified for some categories of IDPs, but not for those who fled foreign
occupation. As stated in Thomas Grant's article,216 a "legal policy in
207. London Declaration, supra note 90, at 10.
208. See Guiding Principles supra note 3.
209. See Law on IDPs, supra note 191.
210. See id. at art. 4, 9, 12.
211. Id. at art. 4.
212. Id.
213. Id. at art. 9.
214. Id. at art. 12.
215. See id. at art. 15.
216. Thomas D. Grant, International Dispute Settlement in Response to an Unlawful Seizure of
Territory: Three Mechanisms, 16 CHICAGO J. INT'L LAw 3 (2015), available at: http://chicago
unbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol16/issl/3.
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response to an unlawful territorial situation is likely to be for a longue
durie."217 Grant refers to Namibia, such status lasting for the entire "time of
the unlawful continuation of South Africa's presence there"; to Northern
Cyprus, and the period "since that area's purported separation from the
Republic of Cyprus in the 1980s"; and to the policy reflected by "Russia's
presence since the early 1990s in the Transdniestria region of Moldova."218
So, considering the timing and inefficiency of international territorial
dispute settlement, generations of people who fled Crimea would likely
remain in the status of IDP's, despite Crimea's designation as "temporarily
occupied territory."219 This unacceptable status quo ultimately will likely
result in a challenge to the status of IDP for Crimeans who fled their
homeland because of Russia's territorial larceny.220
Considering the issue of de jure and de facto jurisdiction over Crimea;
considering the issue of the international conflict, and questions relating to
the location of the international border; considering Russian insistence on
the legality of the "Crimean referendum" (and thus the purported legitimacy
of the annexation of Crimea); and, finally, considering Russia's complicity in
abuses of human rights, the term "internally" is inappropriately applied to
this category of people. The key characteristic here is the fact that people
fled from imposition of foreign sovereignty. The question of jurisdiction is
in issue as is the legal framework in which national authority functions.
Annexation of Crimea prevents Ukraine from any effective control over
Crimean territory, and over Ukrainian nationals who remain there. Only the
Russian Federation enjoys internal effective control, although illegal in all
respects. Annexation of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, imposition of
Russian sovereignty, and actual imposition of effective control over the
territory and people of Crimea are all factors that lead to the ineluctable
conclusion that Russia is an occupying power.
Despite the non-obligatory nature of the Guidelines and despite the
threshold question of the applicability of the concept of IDP to the legal
status of those who fled this foreign occupation, it is the absolute
responsibility of the state to ensure and to protect the whole spectrum of
human rights, and to prevent displacement.221 Moreover, such is the
responsibility of the state that possesses effective control over the
territory.222 In this case, that state is the Russian Federation.
217. Id. at 8.
218. Id.
219. See id. at 3-4.
220. See id. at 7-8.
221. Guiding Principles, supra note 3.
222. Id. at intro. n. 4-5.
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B. THE ISSUE OF AN INTERNATIONAL BORDER
As previously stated, the definition of IDPs derives from the Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement.223 Accordingly,
internally displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have
been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of
habitual residence, in particular as a result of or to avoid the effects of
armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human
rights, or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an
internationally recognized state border.224
The last point in this definition is crucial. It serves as the main criterion
to distinguish IDPs from other groups of forced migrants and, at the same
time, unites different categories of IDPs under a similar legal regime.225
The London Declaration utilizes the same criteria; however, its authors
broaden the concerns of international law to encompass all persons who
have been forcibly uprooted from their homes, regardless of whether they
have crossed national borders.226 In the context of the Crimean crisis, one of
the main questions is whether the people who fled Russian occupation, and
Russia's imposition of foreign sovereignty over Crimea, remain within the
borders of their habitual residence. The other critical question is whether
the criterion of "internationally recognized state border" is equally
meaningful for all categories of IDPs.227
There are at least three perspectives of analysis regarding the status of the
border between Ukraine and Crimea: Ukrainian, Russian, and international.
1. The Ukrainian Perspective
Ukraine does not recognize an international border between Ukraine and
the Crimean peninsula.228 According to the Law "On Ensuring Civil Rights
and Freedoms and the Legal Regime On the Temporarily Occupied
Territory of Ukraine," Crimea remains a part of Ukraine, but has the status
of "temporarily occupied territory" due to Russian military aggression.229
There are currently two inter-state applications lodged by Ukraine against
Russia related to Crimea and pending before the European Court of Human
223. Id. at annex n. 2.
224. Id. (emphasis added).
225. See id.
226. London Declaration, supra note 91; L.T. Lee, Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees:
Toward a Legal Synthesis?, 9 J. REFUGEE STUD. 27, 30-37 (1996); L.T. Lee, Legal Status of
Internally Displaced Persons, 86 ASIL PROC. 631 (1992).
227. London Declaration, supra note 90, at 5.
228. Law on Occupied Territory, supra note 189.
229. Id. at art. 1.
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Rights (ECHR).230 The first case, Ukraine v. Russia (No. 20958/14),
"lodged on March 13, 2014, concerns the events leading up to and following
the assumption of control by the Russian Federation over the Crimean
peninsula from March 2014, and subsequent developments in Eastern
Ukraine up to the beginning of September 2014."231 The other case,
Ukraine v. Russia IV (No. 42210/15), "mainly covers the period as from
September 2014."232 It states:
[T]he Ukrainian Government maintain that Russia has exercised and
continues to exercise effective control over Crimea and - by controlling
separatists and armed groups there - defacto control over the regions of
Donetsk and Luhansk. . . . The Government of Ukraine [inter alia]further refer to arbitrary arrests of Crimean Tatars and pro-Ukrainian
activists, to searches and seizures of churches, and to the abduction and
detention of priests as hostages. The Ukrainian Government state that,
due to the Russian control of Crimea, the operation of Ukrainian law
enforcement and judicial authorities there are suspended
[notwithstanding that some of the judicial personnel continue to work
there under Russian jurisdiction]. . . . There are also more than 1,400
individual applications apparently related to the events in Crimea or the
hostilities in Eastern Ukraine pending before the ECHR. They have
been lodged against both Ukraine and Russia, or exclusively against one
of those States.233
2. The Russian Perspective
Crimea is an Autonomous Subject of the Russian Federation. On March
20, 2014, at the State Duma, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, at President
Putin's request, presented two major issues related to Crimea.234 The first
was the ratification of the Agreement between the Russian Federation and
the Republic of Crimea regarding the annexation of the Republic of Crimea
by the Russian Federation,235 the second being the creation in the Russian
Federation of new subjects of the federation in the Republic of Crimea and
its capital city, Sevastopol.236 After ratification of the Agreement and
adoption of the Constitutional Law No. 475944-6 "On the Acceptance of
230. Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, European Court of Human Rights
communicates to Russia new inter-State case concerning events in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine
(Jan. 10, 2015), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press#).
231. Id. at 1.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1, 2 (emphasis added).
234. Speech by the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, and His Answers to Questions from
Deputies During the Plenary Session of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, Moscow, MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RussiAN FEDERATION (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.mid.ru/en/
web/guest/foreign-policy/news/-/asset-publisher/cKNonkJE2Bw/content/id/69626.
235. Agreement Regarding Annexation, supra note 193.
236. Speech by the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey, supra note 234.
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the Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation and the Creation in the
Russian Federation of New Subjects Crimea and the City of Federal
Importance of Sevastopol" by the Duma, President Putin signed the Law on
March 21, 2014.237 Four hundred forty-five deputies unanimously voted in
favor of the law.238 According to the new Russian Law, the border between
the republic of Crimea and Ukraine is the state border of Russia.239 All
inhabitants of Crimea and Sevastopol became citizens of Russia unless they
claimed within the period of one month following the day of the referendum
that they desire to preserve other citizenship.240 Russia unilaterally imposed
full internal jurisdiction over the territory and over the people of Crimea.241
3. The International Perspective
On March 24, 2014, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a
Resolution "calling on States not to recognize changes in the status of
Crimea. . ." (Resolution on Territorial Integrity of Ukraine).242 The
outcome of the voting was 100 states in favor, 11 against, and there were 58
abstentions.243 As it is stated in a press release:
the Assembly called on States to "desist and refrain" from actions aimed
at disrupting Ukraine's national unity and territorial integrity, including
by modifying its borders through the threat or use of force. It urged all
parties immediately to pursue a peaceful resolution of the situation
through direct political dialogue, to exercise restraint, and to refrain
from unilateral actions and inflammatory rhetoric that could raise
tensions. . . . The draft resolution broke no new legal or normative
ground, but sent an essential message that the international community
237. Federal'nyi Konstitutsionnyj Zakon RF o Priniatii v Rossiiskuju Federatsiju Respubliki
Krym i Obrazovanii v Sostavie Rossiiskoi Federatsii novykh sub'ektov - Respubliki Krym i
Goroda Federalnogo Znachenia Sevastopolia [Federal Constitutional Law RF on the
Acceptance of the Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation and the Creation in the
Russian Federation of New Subjects Crimea and the City of Federal Importance of Sevastopol],
SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL'STVA RossIIsKoI FEDERATSL [SZ RF] [Russian Federation
Collection of Legislation] 2015, No. 6-FKZ, art. 3, available at, at www. pravo.gov.ruNo 0 0
01201412310007.
238. Neil MacFarquhar, Odd Man Out When vote Was 445-1 on Crimea, NEW YORK TIMES
(Mar. 28, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1dAOiTE.
239. The Voice of Russia, Crimea is Now Part of Russia: Putin Signs Treaty, GLOBAL RESEARCH
(Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.globalresearch.ca/crimea-is-now-part-of-russia-putin-signs-treaty/
5373953.
240. Id.; see also Federal Constitutional Law RF on the Acceptance of the Republic of Crimea
into the Russian Federation and the Creation in the Russian Federation of New Subjects
Crimea and the City of Federal Importance of Sevastopol, supra note 237, at art. 4.
241. See The Voice of Russia, supra note 239.
242. Press Release, General Assembly Adopts Resolution Calling upon States Not to Recognize
Changes in Status of Crimea Region, U.N. Meetings Coverage and Press Release GA/1 1493
(Mar. 27, 201), available at http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/gall493.doc.htm.
243. Id.
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would not allow events in Crimea to set a precedent for further
challenges to the rules-based international framework.244
The "referendum" in Crimea was also announced as illegitimate by the
European Commission for Democracy through Law, the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, and other international
organizations.245
That being said, from international and Ukrainian perspectives, people
who fled Crimea did not cross an internationally recognized border. They
retained their nationality, and the Ukrainian government is responsible for
all necessary legal, material, and social support. These factors seem to be
essential if people who fled Crimea fall into the category of Internally
Displaced Persons (IDPs). Current international practice and the position
of UNHCR, particularly in the case of Crimea, speak in favor of this
conclusion; however, such an approach is more idealistic than practical. It
does not take into account existing Russian defacto effective control, defacto
sovereignty, and, consequently, it does not facilitate a solution for the
occupied state nor adequately determine the unique status of these displaced
people.
C. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PERSONS WHO FLEE FOREIGN
OCCUPATION AND THOSE DEFINED AS "INTERNALLY
DISPLACED PERSONS
Although the Guiding Principles are not binding, the document sets forth
the priorities for international practice and is the basis for recommendations
for national policies regarding IDPs.246 The status of those who flee foreign
occupation challenges the contextualization of this category of migrants
within the concept of IDPs.247 The nature of the conflict, that is, whether it
is international or non-international, is determinative as to whether those
who are fleeing Crimea should be subject to the Guidelines.248 To answer
the question whether the certain group of migrants meets the criteria of
IDPs, three essential factors shall be considered.
244. Id.
245. See id.; Eur. Comm. for Democracy Through Law (Venice Comm.), Opinion on Whether
the Decision Taken by the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in Ukraine to
Organize a Referendum on Becoming a Constituent Territory of the Russian Federation or Restoring
Crimea's 1992 Constitution is Compatible with Constitutional Principles, 98th Plenary Sess., Opinion
No. 762/2014 (Mar. 21, 2014), available at http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/
default.aspx?pdffile=CCDL-AD(2014)002-e; Chair Says Crimean Referendum in its Current Form
is Illegal and Calls for Alternative Ways to Address the Cimean Issue, OSCE (Mar. 11, 2014), http://
www.osce.org/cio/1 16313.
246. Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at intro. n. 9-11.
247. See id. at annex n. 2.
248. See id.
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1. The Nature of the Conflict
Determination of the nature of the conflict is essential to identify the
proper legal framework to apply to these circumstances. The status of the
parties to the conflict must first be determined in assessing the nature of
vulnerable groups, reasons for their flight, and the appropriate locus of
liability and compensation.
Regardless of international non-recognition of the border that Russia
postulates, the mere fact that this issue is a matter of international concern
and involves an international dispute between states raises the question of
the applicability of the term "internally displaced persons."249 The fulcrum of
the dispute lies in the international relationship between the Russian
Federation and Ukraine, not between Ukraine and Crimea.
The Guiding Principles do not reflect the issue of internationality, nor
reparation and compensation in an international context. 25 0 On the
contrary, Principle 3 (1) addresses the "primary duty and responsibility" as
being reposed in the national authority.251 As a practical matter, what this
means is that Ukraine has the primary duty and responsibility for Crimean
displaced persons within the territory under Ukrainian control.252
The Guidelines base the main responsibility for IDPs at the particular
stage of the initiation of displacement.253 This is grounded, for example, in
Principle 7, which refers to the "decision" of the state that is identified as the
impetus for displacement, and refers to the state as the "authorities
undertaking such displacement . . . ."254 This principle informs the process
and determines the legality of a state's decision of displacement for the
purpose of protecting IDPs' rights.255 In the Crimean case, as well as in
other similar situations, however, the flight of the people is not due to the
internal policy of the state. The Ukrainian government did not cause the
displacement of the people of Crimea. It is, rather, a spontaneous response
of people to the threat of foreign aggression, and a change in the status quo in
Crimea. The displaced people have made a conscious decision to remain
under the jurisdiction of Ukraine instead of staying under the control of the
Russian occupying power.
2. De Jure and De Facto Control of the State over the Occupied Territory
Russia established the national border with Ukraine based on the territory
that had been formerly denominated the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea.256 Although it is nationally and internationally recognized that
249. See id.
250. See id. at annex n. 2, princ. 3(1).
251. Id. at princ. 3(1).
252. See id.
253. Guiding Principles, supra note 3, princ. 7.
254. Id.
255. See id.
256. Agreement Regarding Annexation, supra note 193.
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Ukraine retains its jurisdiction over the territory of Crimea, and the city of
Sevastopol, the lack of control over these territories is problematic. Russia
adopted its own law, taking jurisdiction over Crimea and the city of
Sevastopol.257 Although Russian law contradicts international law and is not
recognized by the international community, Russia has effective military,
political, and economic control over the territory of Crimea and its
population.258 Russia adopted new laws related to the national border,
Crimea's political institutions, currency regulation, military service, social
security, economic development, citizenship, etc. 2 5 9 The regime of the
occupied territory requires special legal regulation from the Ukrainian
legislature. The most challenging tasks for Ukrainian authority is to
maintain the status quo of the people who live in Crimea, particularly in
terms of their Ukrainian citizenship; to enable Ukrainians to enjoy the rights
granted by the Ukrainian Constitution and legislation; and, at the same time,
to prevent the occupying power from territorial extension and influence
beyond Crimea.260 Non-recognition of the border de jure still requires
security measures related to the border with Crimea.261 The Ukrainian
government cannot neglect the necessity of maintaining some control over
the border between Crimea and the Ukrainian mainland. It is crucial for
preventing the movement of Russians and their military infrastructure to
support terrorist and separatists in Donetsk and Lugansk. Such an existing
de facto border, ironically, leads to the limitation of human rights of
Ukrainian citizens, whether they are among those who fled Crimea for the
mainland, or whether they are among those who have stayed in Crimea and
consequently have become "disconnected" from the mainland.262
3. De Jure and De Facto Control of the State over the People
The reference in the Guidelines to "national authorities" encompasses not
only a territorial dimension, but refers to citizenship as well.263 In the
context of "internal displacement," the obvious link with national authority
is Ukrainian citizenship.264 If those who fled Crimea are Ukrainian citizens,
the concept of "internal" probably could be justified to some extent. But
what if a former Ukrainian and current Russian citizen flee Crimea to
Ukraine? Would such a person be treated as a refugee, or IDP? This
question further underscores the inapplicability of the concept of IDPs to
those who flee foreign occupation and the imposition of sovereignty by an
257. Id. at art. 1.
258. See id.
259. Id. at art. 5.
260. Law on Occupied Territory, supra note 189, at art. 18.
261. Id. at art. 10, 18.
262. Id. at art. 4, 10, 19.
263. Guiding Principles, supra note 3.
264. See id.
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occupying power. Imposition of Russian citizenship265 contradicts the law of
occupation. The rules on citizenship in Crimea are very strict and have
required Ukrainian citizens to make an extremely difficult choice: maintain
Ukrainian citizenship, and thereby be limited in economic, social, and
political rights; or accede to Russian citizenship, and thereby accept being
subject to Russian jurisdiction, with the concomitant consequence of
ultimately losing any possible protection from the state of Ukraine.
Conclusion
At this time there is no explicit governing international law on the status
and rights of IDPs, and scholarly discussion on this subject raises more
questions than it answers. All categories of IDPs have similar needs, and all
of them do need national and international support. The rights of IDPs are
very well stated in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement but, in
the case of foreign occupation, the duties and responsibilities are addressed
to the wrong party. 266 The rights and freedoms of those who flee foreign
occupation can not be safeguarded through the application of the guidelines
regarding internally displaced persons. 267 The Principles also lack guidance
for states and international organizations.268 Ultimately, application of the
Guiding Principles is the wrong approach to the Crimean situation, and it
does not provide an appropriate perspective for adequate legal remedies.
The cause of flight and its attendant circumstances require different legal,
administrative, and political action.
The definition of the status of such persons is crucial in terms of
clarification of the responsible state and potential international participation
in resolving their plight. The obligation of the state to protect people's
rights should be proportional to the jurisdiction that the state enjoys.
Analysis of the Guiding Principles leads to the conclusion that they are
265. Agreement Regarding Annexation, supra note 193, at art. 5; Federal'nyi Zakon RF o
Pravovom Polozenii Inostrannykh Grazdan Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Federal Law on Legal Status
of Foreign Citizens in Russian Federation], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL'STVA ROSSISKOI
FEDERATSL [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2002, No. 115-FZ, art. 2, 8,
9, available at http://archive.mid.ru//ns-osndoc.nsf/e03e22cee6f0c66e43256c630041f8ac/a0528
19e48402515c32575d9002c4486?OpenDocument. Citizens of Ukraine who remain in the
territory of Crimea or in the city of Sevastopol are recognized as Russian citizens. If the
Ukrainians preferred to maintain Ukrainian citizenship, they had to announce such an intention
within one month and actually to apply to do so not later than January 1, 2015. These people
have a right to obtain residence status for five years. Each year the Russian government defines
a quota of how many people can possess the status of temporary residence. In 2014 the quota
was 5000 for temporary residence in Crimea, and 400 in the city of Sevastopol. See also General
Administration for Migration Issues of the Interior Ministry of Russia, GUVM,MVD.RU, http://
www.fms.gov.ru/russian national/dlya-zhiteley-krymaji-sevastopolya/chst-zdvmvprs/ (last
updated Mar. 17, 2016).
266. See Guiding Principles, supra note 3.
267. See id.
268. See id.
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inadequate to deal with the existing circumstances in Crimea.269 In their
stead, four essential factors are herein proposed to establish a new category
comprised of those migrants who have fled foreign occupation. First, the
nature of the conflict, particularly whether it is an international armed
conflict, must be considered. Secondly, the state of human rights in the
occupied territory must be taken into account. Thirdly, it must be
ascertained which state/s have dejure and defacto control over the occupied
territory. And, finally, a determination must be made as to which state/s
have de jure and de facto control over the people within the occupied
territory.
In short, the international legal regime must consider the plight of
Crimean Flight 2014 through a new and expanded lens of forced migration.
Neither the rubric/definition of "refugee" nor that of "internally displaced
person" is adequate protection.
Epilogue
The classification of forced migrants, their needs, and international
remedies all lead to a call for a practical solution. The final consequence
must include fair compensation for displaced persons at the expense of the
occupying power. The longevity of the occupation, exacerbated by its denial
by Russia, has led to abuses of fundamental human rights. Ultimately what
is necessary is the establishment of an independent international entity that
would be responsible for registration of migrants and their claims. It would
act as an Ombudsman Tribunal that would formally acknowledge the claims,
evaluate damages and compensation, and serve as an intermediary in
resolving the issues between the victims, the occupying state, and the state
that has embraced the displaced people and their interests. Such a Tribunal
would indirectly minimize interstate claims, act as a safety valve to release
tension between the parties, and, most importantly, protect the rights of
those who fled the occupied territory, regardless of whether they fled abroad
or elsewhere in the country of their citizenship.
269. See id.
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